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In developing countries, industrialization for  *  Moving factors from areas of low produc-
successful export-led growth has been associated  tivity to areas of high productivity (the factor re-
with rapid structural change and growth in  allocation effect).
productivity.
Exporting heavy and light manufactures
Standard neoclassical growth models have  (the export externality effect).
difficulty explaining this change in performance.
De Melo and Robinson developed a simple  *  importing capital goods (heavy manufac-
analytical model incorporating export extemali-  tures) - the import extemality effect.
ties that capture the large increases in the share
of trade and total factor productivity that are as-  They implement he second model with data
sociated with export-led growth.  from an archetypal semi-industrial country.  The
model accounts for the higher total factor pro-
They developed a second model that breaks  ductivity growth observed in countries pursuing
growth into its various components, which  export-led growth strategies.  It also captures-
include the effects of:  better than do simpler neoclassical models
without disequilibrium features or extemalities
Factor accumulation.  - the pattern of structural change that such
countries experience.
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The relationship between exports and growth is at the heart of much of the debate
on the selection of a country's industrialization  strategy. A central task in the area of trade
policy is to identify the linkages through which trade policy promotes growth.  Though
seldom rigorously formulated, the export-led growth (ELG) strategy, contrasted with the
import-substitution  industrialization (ISI) strategy, has often been cited as the main reason
for obst;rved differences in  development patterns and performance among developing
countries.
Even assuming the superior performance of ELG, there is still active debate about
what exactly is the difference between ISI and ELG and about the mechanisms through
which policies followed under ELG strategies translate into higher growth. For some, it is
the "visible  hand" involving  an interventionist  strategy  of successfully  "picking  winners"  which
is at the heart of ELG [Westphal  (1978); Westphal,  Kim,  and Dahlman (1985)]. For others,
it is the "invisible hand" operating in markets with little government participation which
explains the  success of ELG  [Balassa and Associates (1982), Balassa (1985), Bhagwati
(1988),  Krueger (1985),  Little (1982)]. For the former, a judicious combination of selective
infant-industry protection, export promotion, and intervention accounts for much of the
success  of ELG.  For the latter, a relatively neutral set of incentives  across activities,  which
promotes allocative efficiency, accounts for the superior performance of ELG.
These differences of interpretation aside, when pushed to provide an underlying
theoretical model to explain the superiority of an ELG strategy,  both camps invoke  the loss
of growth from the static distortionary costs due to excessive  market interventions. Theseare  the  efficiency  losses arising from distorted incentives in a  neoclassical  general
equilibrium  model. To these  triangle  losses,  some  would  add the less-easily  conceptualized
losses  due to x-inefficiency  and rent seeking  or direcly unproductive  profit-seeking  (DUP)
activities. Pushed further, both camps,  with varying  enthusiasm,  cite the still-less-easily
conceptualized  losses  due to lower total factor productivity  (TFP) growth  over time and
limited  exploitation  of economies  of scale  because  of small  markets. At this point,  we  have
moved  some  distance  from the static efficiency  arguments  in the neoclassical  model. The
interventionist  school  argues  further  that dynamic  effects  include  mechanisms  of "technology
transfer"  from developed  countries  involving  externalities  that are missed in the static
neoclassical  model.
As argued  in Section  m, the evidence  suggests  that these  dynamic  effects  are crucial
and must be an important  part of any explanation  of the relative  performance  of ELG and
ISI. In Section  IV, we propose  a simple  model incorporating  extemalities  which  captures
one possible  way  of formalizing  the link  between  exporting  and higher  growth.  In Section  V,
we go a step further and develop  a more complete  model in which  externalities  arise not
only from exporting  but also from the acquisition  of technology  embodied  in imported
capital  equipment. In Section  VI, we calibrate  the model  to a Korea-like,  middle  income,
semi-industrial  economy. Comparative  numerical  exercises  indicate  that this model  with
externalities  captures  the pattern of industrialization  and TFP change  in Korea and other
countries  following  an ELG strategy  much  better than the standard  neoclassical  model.
-2-II. Export-Led Growth: The Evidence
The superior performance of countries pursuing  an ELG strategy is well documented
in many comparative studies sponsored by the OECD, NBER, and World Bank.'  From
this literature, a number of suggestive  "stylized  facts' have emerged.
First, countries undergoing ELG have industrialized  by achieving  high growth rates,
increasing trade  shares in  GDP, and  dramatic structural change.  As documented in
Chenery, Robinson, and  Syrquin (1986), countries pursuing ELG strategies had  rapid
structural changes characterized by: (1) rapid increases in the use of intermediate inputs
("deepening"  of their input-output structure) and (2) unbalanced growth led by increased
demand for tradable goods. Typically,  the early phase of ELG industrialization  is led by
light manufacturing, followed by development of  the  intermediate  and  capital goods
sectors. 2
Second, there  is  an  acceleration  in  the  rate  of  economic growth during  the
transformation associated with industrialization. 3 There is a positive correlation (at the
economywide  level) between aggregate growth and TFP growth. One common explanation
for these observations is that there is continuing dynamic  disequilibrium  adjustment in the
tSee comparative  case studies  by Little,  Scitovsky,  and Scott (1970),  Balassa  and Associates  (1971,  1982),
Bhagwati  (1978),  and Chenery,  Robinson,  and Syrquin  (1986). Cross-country  correlations  between  export  growth
and aggregate  growth are presented in Michaely  (1977),  Heller and Porter (1978),  Balassa  (1978),  Feder (1983),
and Jung and Marshall (1985).
2See Chenery,  Robinson, and Syrquin  (1986),  chapters 3, 6, and 7. Balassa (1979) descrbes these phases
in terms of 'stagee of comparative  advantage. See also de Melo (1985),  who compares  Korea and Taiwan.
3Evidence  in  support of the acceleration  hypothesis  during  the industrialization  of today's  developed  countries
is given in Kuznets (1971). Evidence  for today's developing  countries is reviewed  in Syrquin  (1986).
-3-factor markets  as the expanding  industrial  sectors  pull resources  from the agricultural  and
'traditional' sectors. 4
Third,  supply-side  sources  of growth  decompositions  for  countries  that have  followed
an ELG strategy  resemble  more  the pattern of  developed  countries  than the pattern  of other
developing  countries. For ELG countries,  the contributions  of capital  accumulation  and
TFP growth  to total output  growth  are higher  than for other developing  countries  (indeed,
than for developed countries). 5 By itself, these TFP results do not help "explain"
differences  between  ISI and ELG patterns  of development.  Since  the contribution  to growth
of TFP is calculated  residually,  the observed  difference  really  amounts  to a restatement  of
the problem.
Fourth,  limited  cross-country  evidence  using  data  for  manufacturing  sectors indicates
a positive  correlation  between  the role of export  expansion  and TFP growth at the rcwtordl
level. 6 These results are consistent  with the hypothesis  that export expansion  leads to
higher  TFP growth  through  exploiting  econonies of scale,  technology  transfer,  or increasing
competitive  incentives.  There  is  also  evidence  that import  substitution  is  correlated  with  low
T1FP  growth  rates at the sectoral  level. These  results  are consistent  with the hypothesis  that
import substitution (liberalization)  leads to lower (higher) TFP growth by reducing
4The classic  two-sector development  Ladel is Lewis (1954). Bruno (1968),  Robinson (1971),  and Feder
(1986) present two-sector models in which they econometrically  estimate the contribution of disequilibrium
adjustment in the factor markets to  growth.  Syrquin (1986) presents some computations for  archetype
economies.
5rhe  evidence  is detailed in Chenery (1986).
6The evidence  is from Nishimizu  and Robinson  (1984). The countries are Japan (1955-1970),  Korea (1965-
1973),  Turkey (1953-1973),  and Yugoslavia  (1962-1972).  The data cover 16 manufacturing  sectors.
-4-(increasing)  cost-r?duction  incentives. 7 However,  cross-country  variations  in TFP growth
rates are larger  than within-country  variations  across  sectors. This result  indicates  tbit the
contribution  to structural  change  of intersectoral  variations  in TFP growth  rates do not
suffice  to explain  P"e  large differences  in the structure  of final  demand  between  countries
following  ISI and ELrO  strategies.
These results have motivated  a number  of growth-accounting  simulation  exercises
with neoclassical  multisector  models. One strand  of  work  has  sought  tc model  the observed
structural  changes  accompanyint,  ELG. Chenery  and Syrquin  (1986)  and Kubo,  Robinson,
and Urata (1986)  trace the impact  of ELG and ISI strategies  on the structure  of production
in open input-output  models  by imposing  exogenously  the changes  in final demand and
aggregate  trade.  Another strand of work with long-run  computable  general equilibrium
(CGE)  models  relates  changes  in ageregate  zrowth  and in trade structure  to policv  regimes
characteristic  of ISI and ELG strategies. For example,  Chenery  et al. (1986)  characterize
an ELG strategy in a  Korea-like economy  by specifying  neutral incentives (i.e., no
anti-export  bias) and an ISI strategy  by pervasive  import  rationing  resulting  in premia of
over  100 percent on  all  imported goods (largely intermediate and capital goods).
Simulations  representing  a 20-year  period  show  a relatively  small  difference  in growth  rates
between  the two  strategies.  Even  when  exogenous  differences  in TFP growth  rates  between
the two  strategies  are introduced,  the model  still  does  not adequately  capture  the differences
in terminal  year sectoral  output  and demand  structure  typical  of ELG and ISI strategies. 8
7An  alternative,  but not exclusive,  hypothesis  is that export  expansion  and  import  liberalization  increa  TFP
growth  by relaxing  the foreign  exchange  constraint,  facilitating  imports  of nonsubstitutable  intermediate  and
capital  goods.
8See also Lewis,  de Melo,  and Robinson  (1987)  who  compare  different  models  of Koreafs  ELG period.
-5-111.  Externalities  and  Growth
The discussion  above suggests  that empirical work based on the neoclassical  model
only partially captures the stylized  facts of ELG industrialization. Such models indicate that
there are efficiency gains from introducing a policy regime of neutral incentives, but the
gains  are much too small to explain the observed differences  in economic  performance. The
policy  recommendation may  be correct, but it cannot be justified using standard neoclassical
models. The neoclassical  framework must be expanded. One plausible way is to introduce
externalities.  Empirical case studies of countries pursuing ELG, and recent theoretical
work, both support this approach.
Case studies indicate that ELG strategies have taken place with active government
participation,  well beyond simply  preventing  the development of an anti-export bias through
dismantling  policies to limit imports.  On the export side, governments used large direct
subsidies  and, in addition, employed non-price policies,  including  the extensive  use of export
targeting and the establishment of 'trade-promoting organizations"  (TPOs).  In Korea, for
example, the Korea Trade Promotion Corporation (KOTRA) was established as early as
1962  with government funds.  During the early period of ELG industrialization in Korea,
indicative export  targets  were  set jointly  by  the  government and  various exporters'
associations  (with the government exerting leverage through its control of credit and other
regulatory instruments). 9
TPOs have played an important role in successful  ELG strategies by providing trade
information and inquiry services, trade promotion such as trade fairs, market development
9Sce Wcstphal  (1978).advice,  and assistance  to firms  in specialized  areas such  as product  design  and packaging. 10
Keesing  and Singer (1989) argue that TPOs (when efficiently  designed and operated!
promote exports  of manufactured  goods  which,  in turn, generate  hdge potential external
benefits. These  externalities  cannot  be internalized  in earnings  of an individual  exporting
firm (e.g.,  technology  acquisition,  learning,  and training;  buyer's learning;  economies  of
agglomeration;  and general product quality  improvement). 1"  They are analogous  to the
role of infrastructure  in big-push  models  (discussed  briefly  below).
On the import  side,  case  studies  indicate  that countries  pursuing  ELG strategies  have
concentrated their imports more heavily in capital goods and selected intermediates
compared  to countries  pursuing  ISI strategies.  Furthermore,  ELG countries  like Korea  and
Taiwan  experienced  very rapid increases  in the import  content  of exports,  a reflection  not
only  of policies  which  have pr,vided direct and indirect  exporters  with  unrestricted  access
(and tariff  exemptions)  on imported  inputs  but also  of exporting  itself  which  gives  exporters
access  to a tremendous  range of technological  improvements  through  the activities  of the
buyers of their exports.' 2 In several papers, Westphal and his associates  [Westphal
(1982),  Westphal,  Kim,  and Dahlman  (1985)]  have  argued  that the infant-industry  exporting
activity  in Korea hastened  the process  of assimilating  and mastering  foreign  technologies,
thereby offsetting  the static distortionary  costs of the selective  infant-industry  protection
pursued  by the Korean government. They ixgue that the promotion  of infant-industry
10For  a description  of the activities  of TPOs  in four  countries  puruing  ELG  policies,  see Keesing  (1988).
1lThis  evidence  suggests  that  the  benefit  of the  externality  is achieved  through  government  investment.  In
the  models  presented  below,  we  do  not  incorporate  this  link  explicitly,  though  it could  be handled  along  the  lines
suggested  by  Barro  (1988).
12See  de Melo  (1985),  who  shows  that  Korea  and  Taiwan  doubled  the  import  content  of exports  within  a
decade.
-7-exporting  has enforced  the mastering  of 'jreign technology,  since  exportinq  of manufactures
requires  the ability  to meet world  market  standards  in specifications  and quality,  as well as
distribution  and miarketing.13
Recent contributions  to the growth  theory literature  also emphasize  externalities.
Though couched in terms of steady-state  dynamic models, these contributions  have
generated  suggestive  results  for understanding  ELG in developing  countries  (an inherently
unbalanced  process). Three approaches  are especially  interesting. First, some models
introduce  Marshallian  externalities,  either in the form  of  hu  -apital  aCcumulation  [Lucas
(1988)],  or complementarity  between  disembodied  knowledge  and physical  capital  [Romer
'1986)]. These models,  in effect,  introduce  increasing  returns to scale at the economywide
level,  whiie  f,iaintaining  constant  returns to scale at the level of the firm. In addition  to
allowing  for differences  in growth  rates over long  periods  of time,  these mol  Is show  that
a decentralized  equilibrium  can  exist  despite  the existence  of a form  of aggregate  increasing
returns  in production  [Romer (1988a)].
Second,  some -nodels  include a mechanism  whereby  an externality  generates an
acceleration  in the rate of growth. Such  mechanisms  occur in recent growth  models  with
imperfect  competition,  either  Schumpeterian  [Helpman  (1988)]  or monopolistic  competition
[Romer  (1988b)]. In these models,  disembodied  knowledge  is obtained by investment  in
research and development  (R&D). This representation  of how knowledge  is created is
really  more  appropriae.  for  explaining  the creation  of  new  technology  in developed  countries
than for  explainir.'  ¶FP growth  in developing  countries.  However,  the mechanism  by which
1-This  argument  is different  from learning  by doing  [Arrow  (1962)1,  where labor productivity  increases  with
the  level of cumulative  gross investment  or output, although  both arguments  are largely  consistent  with  the  data.
Westphal argues,  however, that the successful  assimilation of imported technology  (the learning) is itself
dependent on the policy  environment.the rate of growth is a positive function of the number of products through investment in
R&D is broadly compatible with some descriptions in  the  development literature  on
adopting and mastering foreign technology.
'IThird,  some models incorporate pecuniary externalities that  enter  via  demand
spillovers  between sectors (for example, models of a "big push" in Murphy, Shleifer, and
Vishny  [1989a,b]). In these models, a low level equilibrium growth path migbt arise in an
uncoordinated market economy  which generates an inefficiently  low level of investment. 14
In such arn  environment, firms capture in their profits only a small fraction of the total
contribution of their investment to aggregate income. Subsidies and grants to investment
are essential.  In the case of infrastructure, adequate investment may not be built without
government assistance. Models with demand spillover effects are also cornsistent  with the
evidence from countries pursuing ELG strategies where infant-industry  exporters acquired
a wide range of foreign technologies. When mastered and assimilated  by the firms engaged
in exporting activities, these technologies  spill over to other activities.
From these recent theoretical contributions, we take on the notions of pecuniary
externalities, spillovers, and the need for government participation either in the form of
coordination of activities or  in the  form of subsidies to  activities which take place at
suboptimal levels.  The importance of government participation will be apparent in the
stylized model  of  an  ELG-productivity link of  Section  IV.  In  the  more  complete
representation of an ELG strategy in the model described in Section V, there will be
spillover benefits to non-industrial sectors from the  improvement of capital equipment
through the increase in the volume of imported capital goods.
"There is an ear!; literature  on similar  "low  level  traps' in economic  development;  see, for example,  Nelson
(1956).
-9-From the case studies,  we retain a stages approach to ELG industrialization. Export
growth first takes place in light manufacturing,  followed by successful  import substitution
(and exports) in heavy industries. In our models, we emphasize the role of externalities as
an engine of growth and industrialization  during the first stage when light manufacturing  is
the leading sector.  We will consider a single 10-20 year transition period rather than
attempt to compare different long-run,  steady-state growth paths.
IV. A Model with an Export Externality
A simple ELG model with an externality linked to exporting is presented in Table 1.  To
help the transition to the more elaborate model with factor markets and intermediate inputs
used in Sections V and VI, we introduce most of the functional  forms to be used later.  The
model starts from de Melo and Robinson (1989).
There is a domestically  produced good, D, which  is an imperfect substitute in demand
with an imported good, M. There is a second domestically  produced good, E, which is sold
on  the  export market  and is not demanded domestically.  The economy can produce
combinations of D and E according to a production possibility  frontier, or "transformation"
function.  In equations 1 and 2, the substitution and transformation possibilities are given
by CES and CET functions, respectively. Foreign trade takes  place at fixed world prices,
i.e., we make the  small-country assumption (equations 3 and 4).  For  now, aggregate
production, X, is fixed. The  balance of trade constraint, equation 10, precludes any free
lunch, and equations 6 to 9 specify  profit maximization  by producers and cost minimization
by demanders.  Equation 11 is the market-clearing condition.
-10-Table 1: AN EXPORT-EXTERNALITY  MODEL
(1)  Q  = F(M, DD; u)  CES aggregation  function
(2)  X = AG(E,  DS; D)  CET transformation  function
(3)  Pr=  R.Im.(1  + tm)  Import price
(4)pc  =  R.,rC(1  + te)  Export price
(5)  pt  Pd.(1  + td)  Tax-ridden domestic price
(6)  Pq =f 1(pc,  pt; a)  Consumer price
(7)  px =  gl(pC, pd; n)  Producer  price
(8)  M/DD =  f2(Pm,  P'; a)  Import demand equation
(9)  E/DS = g2(Pr,  Fd; 0)  Export supply  equation
(10)  A  = A.(E/EO)-"  Export externality  (E > Eo,q  > 0, A  = A if E  < EO)
(11)  fm.M = xr'E  Balance of trade constraint
(12)  DD - Ds  = 0  Domestic  demand  = supply
'Variables
M, E  = Imports, exports
DD, Ds  = Demand and supply  of the domestic  good
Q  = Composite  consumer  good
X  = Fixed aggregate  composite  production
tim,  me  = Fixed world prices of imports and exports
R  = Conversion  factor or "nominal'  exchange  rate
Pm  c  = Domestic prices of imports  and exports
pd  pt  =  Domestic prices of domestic  sales, D, exclusive  and inclusive  of sales tax
pq, px  = Domestic prices of composite  consumer  good, 0, and composite  output, X
Parameters
a, a  = Elasticity  of substitution  (CES), elasticity  of transformation  (CET)
ip, Eo  = Externality  parameters
-11-The export  externality  is introduced  in equation  10,  which  states that the amount  of
(composite)  domestic  production  is  an increasing  function  of exports  beyond  some  base  level
volume  of exports,  Eo. This is a true externality  since  the first-order  condition,  equation  9,
does not take equation 10 into account. Producers  do not see the benefits  of export'n
beyond  the competitively  determined  level and, hence,  do not internalize  the presence  of
equation 10.15
In equation  2, ignoring  A, the transformation  function  is homogeneous  of degree 1
in E and D.  Just as in the recent growth  models  with externalities,  where A represents
disembodied  technological  knowledge  that receives  no compensation,  here the funcdon  for
A is also treated as purely external. In Atrow (1962)  and Romer (1986),  the choices
concerning the  rate  of  accumulation  of  capital make the evolution of  productivity
endogenous.  In equation  10,  there are assumed  to be productivity-enhancing  effects  that are
associated  with exporting  and so affect  the A parameter.
Figure  1 illustiates  both the competitive  equilibrium  in the stylized  model  of  Table 1
and the optimum  solution  that takes  into  account  the externality  in equation  10. Quadrant  I
depicts  the external  balance  of trade constraint,  which  is the 45 degree  line since,  by choice
of units,  we set wm  = wre  =  1 (and R a 1 by choice  of numeraire).  Quadrant IV depicts  the
production  possibility  curve perceived  by producers  and the production  possibility  curve,
takdng  into account  the externality.  The corresponding  consumption  possibility  frontiers  are
shown  in quadrant  II. Finally,  quadrant  Im  is the 45 degree  line which  specifies  equilibrium
in the market for domestic  sales. The competitive  solution  is at points P and C, but the
15This  specification  is similar  to that in other  trade theory  models  analyzing  arguments  for infant  export
industr  protection;  see Bhagwati  (1978)  and the dynamic  model  by Mayer  (1984).
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Figure 1: Diagram  of the Export-Externality  Model
optimal  solution  is at P* and C*. 16 The optimal  solution  will  obtain either as a result of
government  intervention,  as discussed  below,  or as a result of producers  internalizing  the
externality,  in which case equation (9) would  be replaced  by a first order condition  that
includes  %,  yielding  a full-information  competitive  model.
It should  be obvious  that, for a given  initial  structure,  the welfare  gain from  an ELG
strategy  will be increasing  in r1. The gain will also depend  on the values  of a and n, the
(income compensated)  price elasticities  of demand for imports and supply  of exports,
respectively.  As a typical  case, consider  an industrializing  economy  with 10  percent trade
shares in GDP  (assume X  =  100 and E  =  M =  10).  Sensitivity calculations for this
16An iuteresting  question is whether the competitive  solution  is always  stable. In our empirical  applications,
it is stable, but it is easy to pick parameter values where it is not.
-13-hypothetical  economy  are shown  in Table 2, which  reports the full-information  optimum
solution  values  for absorption,  0, which  is the appropriate  welfare  indicator. 17 For given
values  of r7,  the welfare  gain is increasing  in a and n.  For example,  for the first set of runs,
with ,  = 0.1,  the trade share in expenditure  increases  from 13.1  percent to 20.0  percent as
the values  of a and n are raised from 0.75  to 3.0. For high  values  of both t7 and n, the
transformation function becomes very flat.  For values tq = 0.3, a = 3.0, and n  = 3.0, the
model  was infeasible.
What  combination  of parameter  values  best  represents  a typical  country  following  an
ELG strategy?  If  one takes  the Korean  experience  between  1965  and 1975,  the combination
of parameters  in Run 12 (,l = 0.2,  a  = 3.0, n = 1.5) seems plausible. That combination
gives  a productivity-ELG  link.  of 1.27  percentage  points  per year (12.7%  increase  in output
divided  by 10  years)  and an increase  in export  share in GDP from 10  percent  to 25 percent
under the assumption  that the externality  is fully exploit'ed. Korea's performance  was
spectacular,  and one would expect other more typical countries to achieve a similar
transformation  over,  say,  20 rather than 10 years.
Since,  by definition,  the externality  is not perceived  by  the agents,  it can be exploited
only through policy intervention. The model in Table 1 includes three price-wedge
instruments:  (1) an export subsidy,  te; (2) a tariff, tm; and (3) an indirect tax on the
domestic  good,  td.  Any net taxes or subsidies  are financed  by nondistorting,  lump-sum
transfers  from  or to the single  household.  The government  does  not demand  goods. Given
these instruments,  we analyze  three policy  scenarios:  an export  subsidy  alone; an export
"We  also choose  0  as the numeraire  good, setting Pq - 1.
-14-Table 2: SENSITIVITY  EXPERIMENTS
Parameter Values:  Solution Values:
Run  ETA (qi)  SIGMA (o)  OMEGA (a)  0 - Y  M - E  DD = DS
1  0.1  0.75  0.75  101.6  133  88.8
2  0.1  1.50  0.75  101.9  13.9  88.4
3  0.1  0.75  1.50  102.2  14.7  88.5
4  0.1  1.50  1.50  102.8  16.1  87.6
5  0.1  3.00  1.50  103.3  17.2  86.7
6  0.1  1.50  3.00  103.7  18.4  86.8
7  0.1  3.00  3.00  104.6  20.9  85.1
8  0.2  0.75  0.75  106.6  16.9  91.5
9  0.2  1.50  0.75  107.5  17.4  91.0
10  0.2  0.75  1.50  109.2  20.7  92.2
11  0.2  1.50  1.50  111.1  22.9  91.2
12  0.2  3.00  1.50  112.7  24.8  90.0
13  0.2  1.50  3.00  114.5  28.7  91.2
14  0.2  3.00  3.00  117.4  33.2  88.6
15  0.3  0.75  0.75  116.4  21.7  98.4
16  03  1.50  0.75  118.2  22.9  97.8
17  0.3  0.75  1.50  123.2  29.4  102.1
18  0.3  1.50  1.50  127.1  32.1  100.9
19  0.3  3.00  1.50  130.2  35.3  99.2
20  0.3  1.50  3.00  135.8  44.6  103.4
21  0.3  3.00  3.00  NS  NS  NS
NS: No solution  (infeasible).
Variables  and parameters are defined in Table 1.
-15-subsidy  financed by an indirect tax, given a government  revenue  constraint;  and export
targeting.
We use the model  to solve  for optimal  policy  combinations.  The problem  is treated
as a nonlinear  program,  maximizing  absorption  Q subject  to the equations  in Table 1 as
constraints. 18 The tax rates are instrumental  variables.  In some  experiments,  it is possible
to achieve the full-information  optimum.  In others, given additional constraints  on
government  revenue  or export  targets,  we  consider  the costs  of not being  able to attain the
full-information  solution.
The results  of these scenarios,  which  all start from run 12 in Table 2, are reported
in Table  3. Consider  the tax and subsidy  experiments.  Using  export  subsidies  alone  would
achieve  the optimum  and would  require  an export  subsidy  rate of 150  percent  at a fiscal  cost
representing  25 percent  of GDP. GATT  surveillance  notwithstanding,  this approach  would
raise  the eyebrows  of even  the most  outward-looking  finance  ministerl In an economy  with
a well-established  and efficient  tax collection  system,  the full  benefit  of the externality  could
be achieved  at no net cost to the treasury  by combining  a 25 percent production  tax with a
98 percent export subsidy  (experiment  4).  Alternatively,  by Lerner symmetry,  the same
production  tax could be combined  with a 50 percent subsidy  to imports  (experiment  5).19
It  is unlikely that the full benefits of an  externality  are achievable by policy
intervention  if only  because  of ignorance  about the exact  nature of the externality  and thus
t The model  is solved  using  the GAMS  software;  see Brooke,  Kendrick,  and Meeraus  (1988).
19Accounting  for the nunmeraire,  the product  of the exchange  rate and export  subsidy  in row  4 of Table  3
equals  the exchange  rate times  the import  tariff  in row  S.
-16-Table  3:  POLICY EXPERIMENTS
Variables  and  parameters:
No.  Experiment  Q-Y  E-M  D  px  r  P  p  ER  te  td  tm  GR
1  BASE  RUN  100.0  10.0  90.0  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
2  FULL  INFO  112.7  24.8  90.0  1.13  0.77  0.77  1.04  0.74  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Tax  and  subsidy  experiments:
3  te  112.7  24.8  90.0  1.41  1.91  0.77  1.04  0.74  1.50  0.0  0.0  -28.2
4  te  & td  112.7  24.8  90.0  1.13  1.53  0.77  1.04  0.74  0.98 0.25 0.0  0.0
5  td  & tm  112.7  24.8  90.0  1.13  1.53  0.77  1.04  1.47  0.0  0.25  -. 50 0.0
Government  Revenue  Constraint  experiments:
6  GR - -5  106.7  14.3  92.7  1.12  1.26  0.91  1.01  0.90 0.39  0.0  0.0 -5.0
7  GR - -10  109.8  17.3  93.0  1.20  1.44  0.86  1.02  0.84 0.67  0.0  0.0  -10.0
8  GR - -15  111.4  19.7  92.6  1.26  1.59  0.83  1.03  0.80 0.92  0.0  0.0  -15.0
9  GR - -20  112.3  21.9  91.8  1.32  1.72  0.80  1.03  0.78  1.14  0.0  0.C  -20.0
10  GR  - -28.2  112.7  24.8  90.0  1.41  1.91  0.77  1.04  0.74  1.50  0.0  0.0  -28.2
Export  target  experiments:
11  E  - 15  107.6  15.0  92.9  1.08  0.90  0.90  1.01  0.88  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
12  E  - 20  111.5  20.0  92.5  1.12  0.82  0.82  1.03  0.80  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
13  E - 30  111.4  30.0  85.0  1.11  0.72  0.72  1.06  0.68  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
For  all these  experiments  X - 100,  Pq  - 1, a  - 3.0,  n - 1.5,  tj - 0.2. The Base  Run solution  assumes
no actor  sees  externalities.  The  Full  Information  solution  is  the  optimum.
Variables  and  parameters  are  defined  in  Tables  1  and  2. ER  is  the  real  exchange  rate,  which  equals
R/Pd. The  solution  values  for  the  nominal  exchange  rate,  R, are  the  same  as the  solution  values
of  r.  GR is  net  government  revenue  from  tax  collection  and  subsidy  disbursement.about  the  optimal  mix of  policies.2 0 Experiments imposing a  government  revenue
constraint and  export targeting give an  idea  of  the  cost  of  departing from  the  full-
information optimum. The government revenue constraint experiments indicate that half
of the benefits of the externality can be obtained with an export subsidy of 39 percent.
Likewise, setting the  volume of exports at  15 (about a  third of the  way between the
competitive and full-information solutions) achieves over half of the externality benefits.
The implication  is that, if our representation of the externality  is a reasonable approximation
of how ELG works, the cost of policy  errors is not large. 21
V. A Model with Import and Export Externalities
The small model with an export externality illustrates the implications of capturing
the potential role of export promotion in a development strategy. If such externalities are
present, they are well worth exploiting. However, this model only captures some of the
stylized facts characteristic of ELG discussed above.  Also, while the stylized model is
suggestive,  it is highly aggregated and cannot capture the changes in sectoral structure that
are typical of countries undergoing industrialization. In this section, we expand the model
to incorporate a bit more sectoral structure and include an additional externality  mechanism
through which expanded trade is thought to affect economic performance.
"In a different  context,  authors  such  as Harberger  (1988)  have  argued  that  uniform  tariffs  should  be pursued
even  granted  the theoretical  argument  that they  are not optimal  because  of ignorance  of the parameters  needed
to compute  optimal  tariffs.
210f course,  this result  depends  crucially  on the  particular  functional  form  chosen  for the  externality  linkage.
-18-In extending  the neoclassical  growth  model to include  externalities,  the idea is to
capture the major  observed  differences  in the pattern of industrialization  between  ISI and
ELG development  strategies.  A model  of the transformation  requires,  at a minimum,  four
sectors:  agriculture,  light  manufacturing,  heavy  manufacturing,  and services.  We  start from
archetype  models  of developing  countries  at different  stages  of development  described  in
Chenery,  Robinson,  and Syrquin  (1986).
We extend  the model  presented  in Table 1 in a number  of ways. Detailed  equations
are presented  in the Appendix.  The product  differentiation  assumptions  with  regard  to both
exports  and imports  are carried over to each ol the four sectors.22  We add interindustry
linkages,  assuming  a Leontief  technology  for demands  for intermediate  inputs. We include
primary  inputs,  labor and capital,  with  sectoral  Cobb-Douglas  production  functions  for real
value  added.
On the demand  side,  we specify  a single  representative  consumer  with an extended
Stone-Geary  utility function  that includes  savings.23  Final demand thus includes both
consumer  goods  and capital  goods,  yielding  the extended  linear  expenditure  system  (ELES).
We choose as the numeraire  price the cost function  corresponding  to the ELES utility
function,  so that maximizing  supernumerary  expenditure  is equivalent  to maximizing  the
indirect  utility  function.
As in  the  previous model, government coliects indirect taxes and  tariffs, pays
subsidies,  and finances  any  difference  through  lump-sum  transfers.  We  also  retain  the small-
country  assumption,  with fixed  international  prices of sectoral  exports  and imports. The
2There is a two-way  trade in every  sector  except  services  in which  there  are no imports.
2The  expenditure  system  is the ELES  or extended  linear expenditure  system;  see Lluch,  Powell,  and
Williams  (1977).
-19-balance of trade is also fixed exogenously,  with the real exchange  rate serving as the
equilibrating  variable.
Export externalities  enter exactly  as in the small  model but now appear in two
sectors:  light  and heavy  manufacturing.  Exports  of agriculture  and services  are assumed  to
generate  no extemalities.  We  also  add an additional  externality  that works  through  imports.
We assume  that imported  capital  goods  are more productive  than domestic  capital  goods.
Since  the model  is static,  with  a fixed  aggregate  capital  stock,  current  imports  cannot  affect
the current  capital  stock. However,  we  are doing  comparative  statics  experiments  designed
to represent  roughly  a decade of rapid growth. We postulate  a link between  the import
ratio in heavy  manufacturing  and the productivity  of the capital  stock  in the comparative
statics  experiraer,ts.  The functional  form is analogous  to that for the export  externality:
B = (M/M)X; n >  0
KC =  Be.
where Kc  is the economywide  effective  capital  stock.
The effect  of this formulation  is to specify  a link  between  the import  ratio in heavy
manufacturing  and the size of the "effective"  capital  stock. In the static model,  this link is
treated as an import  externality  that affects  the aggregate  capital stock  At the sectoral
level,  we assumne  either that producers  do not see that raising  the import  ratio will  increase
the effective  capital  stock  for their sector  or that the productivity  increase  is not achieved
unless it is widespread.
As in the small  modeL  the existence  of export  and import  externalities  will  lead to
potential  welfare  gains  from policy  intervention.  We  include  three price  wedge  instruments:
an export subsidy in light and heavy manufacturing  and an import subsidy  in heavy
-20-manufacturing.  In simulating  alternative  development  strategies,  we again  solve  the model
as a nonlinear  program,  maximizing  the utility  of the representative  consumer  subject  to all
the model equations  and solving  for the optimum  levels  of the three subsidy  instruments.
The three policy  instruments  are not independent  and, as in the small  model,  one could
choose alternative instruments  that would achieve the same optimum (e.g., domestic
production  taxes  or subsidies).
In modelling  both import  and export  externalities,  we are postulating  a link  but are
not specifying  the mechanism  by which  the externality  works. For example,  the acquisition
of technological  mastery  through  imports  of capital  goods  invo -rs learning,  requiring  both
time and resources. Likewise,  on the export  side,  developing  e!ftcient  institutional  support
for exporting  involves  investment.  In the model,  these  links  are costless  and,  in comparative
statics experiments,  timeless  as well. The elasticities  in the various  externality  equations
should  be interpreted  as implicitly  incorporating  these costs.
Table  4 reports  the structure  of the model  economy  in the base  year. The data are
drawn from Chenery, Robinson,  and Syrquin  (1986)  and represent an archetype  semi-
industrial  country  with  per capita  income  of $600  (in 1970  dollars). This economy  is in the
early to middle  phase of the industrial  transformation  described  by Chenery  and Syrquin
(1986).  We  seek to capture  the transition  to the next  stage,  which  involves  roughly  doubling
per capita income and lowering  agriculture's  share of GDP from 20 percent to about 15
percent.
During this  transition, resources move out  of  agriculture, mostly into  light
manufacturing.  Vernon  (1989)  describes  technical  change  in the production  of such  goods
as  characterized  by process rather than product innovation.  In Vernon's view, the
.21-Table 4: STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY IN THE BASE YEAR
Total or
Agriculture  Light mfg  Heavy mfg  Services  average
Composition (%)
Output  18.7  32.4  15.7  33.2  100.0
Value added  20.5  22.0  12.5  45.0  100.0
Employment  38.3  19.2  6.5  36.0  100.0
Capital stock  20.4  13.9  9.0  56.7  100.0
Exports  38.3  21.1  16.5  24.1  100.0
Imports  16.7  17.9  65.4  0.0  100.0
Ratios (%)
Exports/output  22.8  7.2  11.7  8.1  11.1
Imports/output  12.1  7.5  56.4  0.0  13.5
Price elasticities
Import demanda  4.0  1.1  0.8  4.0
Export supplyb  4.0  3.0  0.5  4.0
Consumer demandc  -0.7  -0.8  -1.0  -1.0
Income elasticity  0.8  0.8  1.3  1.3
Productivity ratios (%)d
Labor  61.5  124.7  122.2  123.8  100.0
Capital  84.1  143.7  193.9  80.1  100.0
Notes:
aCompensated price elasticity (= a).
bCompensated price elasticity (-  n).
CMarshallian  (uncompensated) own-price  elasticity.
dRatio to the economywide  average.
-22-acquisition  of technology  in these sectors relies on machine:y  suppliers and in-house
production  engineers  rather than on in-house  R&D. This -iew  of technological  change  in
light  manufacturing  is also consistent  with Westphal's  interpretation  of Korea's  experience
with  export-led  growth. Thus,  we do not try to capture the next stage of industrialization
during  which  growth  shifts  towards  heavy  industry  with  performance-sensitive  products  for
which  technical  change  requires  substantial  amounts  of R&D  expenditures. 24
The elasticities  of import  demand  and export  supply  specified  for light  and heavy
manufacturing  in Table 4 reflect  this view. It is technically  relatively  easy  to produce  light
manufactures  for exporting  and relatively  difficult  for heavy  manufacturing. It is also
assumed  to be difficult  to produce  a domestic  substitute  for imported  heavy  manufacturing
goods.
Note that in Table  4, in line  with  the empirical  evidence  reviewed  earlier,  we  assume
that the marginal  products  of labor and capital  are lower in agriculture  than in industry.
The model includes  distortion  parameters  which  specify  a fixed  ratin of sectoral  marginal
products  for labor and capital  relative  to the economywide  averages  (a complete  equation
listing  is given  in the Appendix).  Capturing  the productivity  gains  from moving  resources
out of agriculture  is  achieved  in the model  by simply  setting  all these parameters  to one and
resolving.25
14Korea has recently increased its share of R&D expenditures in GNP from 057 percent in 1980 to
3.0 percent in, 1986. This current trend is more consistent with the recent theoretical literature on R&D
externalities  discussed  earlier and is indicative  of Korea's maturation.
25The  Appendix describes  the equations and data sources.
-23-VI. Illustrative Simulations of ELG Industrialization
We  now  see if the extension  of the neoclassical  model  to include  an export  externality
and an import  externality  captures  the observed  differences  in growth  and industrialization
patterns between ISI and ELG strategies. As mentioned above, our simulations  are
intended to portray  the transition  to an industrial  economy  with a sizable  "light  industry"
sector.
The focus  of the simulations  is to see how far the trade externalities  go toward
endogenizing  the contribution  of TFP  growth  to overall  growth  and the pattern of  structural
change  typical  of ELG industrialization  strategies.  With the static  model,  the simulations
consist  of factor accumulation  and exogenous  technological  change (in agriculture  only)
augmented  by the presence of the externalities  described  in Section  V.  The results  are
presented  in Tables  5 and 6.
To isolate  the contribution  of the trade externalities,  we  report  four  experiments  (see
the bottom  of Table 5). The first  three experiments  are cumulative.  In the first  experiment,
El, growth  and structural  change  are entirely  through  factor accumulation  and exogenous
technological  change  in agriculture  that combines  deepening  of interindustry  linkages  and
exogenous  TFP growth  (see  the Appendix).  The net effect  is  a residual  contribution  of TFP
to total growth  of less than 1 percent. Experiment  El  reflects  the growth  and structural
change  that would  be generated  by the neoclassical  growth  model.  The second  experiment,
E2, recognizes  that a productivity  gain is realized  by moving  factors  out of low-productivity
agriculture. As can be seen from the top of Table 5, the contribution  of the "residual"  tu
-24-Table 5:  EXPERIMENT  RESULTS,  AGGREGATE VARIABLES
Experiments  El  E2  E3  E4
Base  Factor  Factor  Externality  Externality
solution  growth  reallocation  1  2
GDP change (%)  0.0  54.9  59.6  77.8  109.0
Growth contributions  (%)
Labor  0.0  30.5  28.1  21.5  153
Capital  0.0  68.5  63.2  48.5  34.8
Residual  0.0  1.0  8.7  30.0  49.9
Ratios (%)
Exports/GDP  222  26.6  25.0  33.5  44.6
Imports/GDP  27.0  31.3  29.6  37.6  48.1
Foreign savings/GDP  4.8  4.2  4.6  3.5  2.7
Real exchange  rate index  100.0  111.5  98.5  106.5  124.0
Agricultural  terms of  100.0  82.6  103.9  106.8  109.7
trade
Export subsidy (%)
Light mfg  0.0  0.0  0.0  42.3  443
Heavy mfg  0.0  0.0  0.0  51.4  79.5
Import subsidy  (%)
Heavy mfg  0.0  0.0  0.0  24.6  49.7
Externality  indices:
Effective  production
Light mfg  100.0  100.0  100.0  118.6  143.3
Heavy  mfg  100.0  100.0  100.0  103.0  1063
Effective  capital  100.0  100.0  100.0  102.5  112.8
stock
Description  of experiments:
El  =  Factor accumulation + exogenous  technological  change in agriculture  (see text and appendix).
E2  =  El  + removal  of factor productivity  differentials.
E3  - E2 + low  externality  parameters (see text).
E4  =  E2 + high  externaliq parameters (see text).
-25-Table 6: EXPERIMENT RESULTS,  SECTORAL  VARIABLES
Experiments:  El  E2  E3  E4
Base  Factor  Factor  Fxternality  Externality
solution  growth  reallocation  1  2
Agriculture
Output index  100.0  233.1  195.2  161.6  138.5
Producer price index  100.0  85.2  102.3  114.1  127.9
Consumer price  100.0  84.2  102.4  113.3  121.8
index
Exports/output  %)  2.8  29.2  21.8  10.6  5.4
Imports/output (%)  12.1  7.8  12.9  33.8  72.5
Light manufacturing
Output index  100.0  145.1  161.1  215.6  267.8
Producer price index  100.0  109.7  103.8  107.7  113.7
Consumer price  100.0  109.2  103.8  84.0  69.4
index
Exports/output (%)  7.2  4.1  6.7  27.6  44.0
Imports/output (%)  7.5  9.6  7.8  6.0  5.0
Heavy  manufacturing
Output index  100.0  172.0  208.1  226.0  230.8
Producer price index  100.0  97.8  81.9  82.8  85.1
Consumer price  100.0  95.5  87.2  70.6  57.3
index
Exports/output (%)  11.7  11.3  13.0  16.1  17.6
Imports/output (%)  56.4  60.6  45.6  53.9  75.0
Services
Output index  100.0  166.4  174.4  167.8  172.0
Producer price index  100.0  100.4  103.0  121.1  141.0
Consumer price  100.0  101.1  103.1  122.6  143.1
index
Exports/output (%)  8.1  5.4  7.5  3.0  1.3
Imports/output (%)  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Composition  of real GDP (%)
Agriculture  20.5  27.1  22.2  18.0  14.7
Light manufacturing  22.0  18.1  19.7  25.7  30.4
Heavy  manufacturing  12.5  12.2  14.5  153  14.9
Services  45.0  42.6  43.6  41.0  40.0
-26-growth is now almost 9 percent. In terms of GDP growth, this factor relocation effect raises
GDP by 5 percenitage  points.
In  the  next two experiments, the  externalities in  exporting of light  and  heavy
manufactures and in importing of heavy manufactures are introduced. In E3, the values of
all externality par2meters are set at 0.1; in E4, the export externality parameters are set at
0.15 and tthe  import externality  parameters at 0.20. The contribution  of the two externalities
to effective production and to the economywide  effective  capital stock are reported at the
bottom of Table 5.  The empirical result is a contribution of TFP growth to total growth of
30 to 50 percent, which is consistent with empirical evidence.
Experiment El  represents  an "equilibrium" neoclassical description of an  ELG
strategy. Adding the "disequilibrium"  assumption of differential factor productivity  growth
during the transformation stabilizes  the agricultural terms of trade index, a widely  observed
stylized  fact of development over relatively long time periods.  For an economy following
a manufacturing ELG strategy, the factor reallocation effect also has some effect toward
stabilizing the  value  of  the  relative price  of tradables  because  tradables  (which are
concentrated  in  manufacturing) benefit  from cheaper  capital  and  labor  through  the
reallocation effect. Note, however,  that the factor reallocation  effect has little effect on the
openness of the economy as the aggregate ratios of exports and imports to GDP are very
similar  for  El  and  E2.  As  a  first  approximation, E2  corroborates  numerically the
acceleration hypothesis  during the transition but does not contribute toward an explanation
of structural change.
In E3, where externality effects are small, there is some.  change in the real exchange
rate  and  terms-of-trade indices compared to  E2 but  nothing dramatic.  Openness is
-27-increased  by about a third, with exports  and imports  reaching  35 percent of GDP. 26 The
factor accumulation  rates in the experiments  approximate  those realized  by Korea during
1975-1985.  Assuming  the experiments  represent  a decade,  the implied  compound  growth
rate is 5.2 percent per annum under E3, which is much less than the 7.7 percent rate
achieved  by Korea during  that period. The externality  effects  assumed  in E4 result in an
annual  compound  growth  rate of 7.7  percent,  matching  historical  performance. However,
E4 overestimates  structural  change  (in terms of openness)  during  that period,  whereas  E3
yields  an increase  in openness  very  close  to the one achieved  by Korea during 1975-1985.
Table  5 indicates  the implications  for  structural  change  of incorporating  "disequilibri-
um"  in factor markets  and externalities  into the basic  neoclassical  CGE model. The factor
reallocation  effect  (experiment  E2) prevents  the agricultural  sector  from  increasing  its share
in GDP,  but it misses  entirely  the change  in the sectoral  structure  of foreign  trade that takes
place  during  a manufacturing  ELG industrialization  strategy.  In experiment  E2, import  and
export shares in gross output are too high for agriculture and too low for industry,
particularly  for heavy manufacturing. By contrast, with externalities,  the CGE model
captures much better the surge in light manufacturing  exports (e.g., textiles  and other
consumer  goods) and heavy manufacturing  (e.g., capital goods) imports as well as the
declining  share  of agricultural  exports  and rising  share  of  agricultural  imports.  The patterns
of structural  change  in output and foreign  trade under E3 and E4 replicate fairly  closely
those observed  during  the early to middle  phase of ELG in countries  such  as Korea and
Taiwan  when  growth  was greatest  in light manufacturing  sectors.
26Because  foreign  savings  is maintained  to a fixed  value  currency  units  in E3 and E4, its share in GDP
declines  with  increasing  externalities.
-28-One last stylized  feature of ELG growth  is nicely  captured  by the modified  model
with trade extemalities. Williamson  (1979),  citing  the Kim and Roemer (1979)  study  of
Korea's industrialization,  notes that, in contrast  with most other developing  countries,
Korea's relative  (to GDP) price index  of investment  goods  declined  by approximately  40
percent during  the period 1962-1975.  Table 6 shows  that with the subsidy  to imports  of
heavy  manufacturing  necessary  to induce  the acquisition  of heavy  manufacturing  imports,
there is a dramatic  decline  in the domestic  purchaser's  price index  of heavy  manufacturing
products. The producer  price index  of heavy  manufacturing  iicreases between  E3 and FA
because  of the more than doubling  of the export subsidy  to heavy  manufacturing  in E4
compared  to E3. It is also interesting  to note that the subsidy  rates in experiments  E3 and
E4 are in line with the subsidies  to infant  industry  exports  described  by Westphal  (1982).
The patterns of structural  change  in Table 6 are, of course,  only suggestive,  but they do
capture the salient differences in structural change observed between ISI and ELG
strategies.
In these  experiments,  the policy  mix  involves  only  subsidies  to exporting  manufactures
and importing  heavy  manufactures. As with the small model,  the total expense  of the
program  is large. In the high  elasticity  externality  experiment  (E4),  the cost  of all subsidies
equals 12  percent  of gross  sales and 27 percent of GDP. We did an additional  experiment
that started from E4, but added a uniform  indirect  tax rate (td) of 15 percent. The result
is a similar  pattem of subsidies,  but essentially  no net tax on households. It is certainly
feasible  to design  a mix of indirect  taxes  and subsidies  that exploit  the externalities,  with
little impact  on total net tax revenue. The implied  sectoral  tax and subsidy  rates are also
within  observed  ranges  for semi-industrial  countries.
-29-VII. Conclusion
In spite of their extreme simplicity,  there are a couple of lessons to be learned from
the stylized  models incorporating export and import externalities. First, from a theoretical
perspective,  the approach appears to be fruitful. The models capture well the major stylized
facts of growth and structural change in countries undergoing ELG.  They also overcome
a major shortcoming of the neoclassical model.  In the neoclassical model, TFP growth
appears by magic, with no link to changes in economic structure or policy  choices. These
trade-externality models provide a  first step toward endogenizing major driving forces
generating measured total factor productivity  growth in ELG countries. They also provide
a  better  framework for analyzing the  links between aggregate economic performance,
structural change, and policy choices.
Second, there is a lesson for policy  analysts. In the presence of externalities, many
of the simple policy rules emanating from the neoclassical general equilibrium model are
no longer valid.  Policy rules aimed toward minimizing static efficiency losses may miss
potential gains arising from policy  links to externalities. As is common in economics,  there
appear to be some trade-offs-in this case, between static efficiency  costs and dynamic  gains
from exploiting externalities linked to  export performance and  import structure.  The
empirical results with the small export-externality  model and the second model adding an
import externality,  support this view and suggest a change in policy  perspective. If there are
externalities to be exploited, policymakers  should pursue them aggressively  and not worry
overmuch about getting the instruments  just right. The simulations  indicate that, when there
-30-are rectangles to be gained, an economy can easily afford to lose some triangles along the
way.
The simple stylized models of ELG presented here are  based on  the empirical
experience of countries that have pursued successful  ELG strategies.  Yet, they are only
skeletal models that  emphasize one possible explanation of TFP growth:  Marshallian
externalities. In this environment, the empirical results support the view that policymakers
should pursue  an  interventionist policy regime to  coordinate private  sector  activities.
Further work is needed to explore the channels through  which the externalities operate and
interact with the structural changes  that accompany  industrialization.  The models  developed
here are only a first step in that direction.
-31-Appendix
This appendix  completes  the description  of the model  presented  in Section  V. The
following  notation is adopted throughout. If double subscripts  are employed,  the first
subscript  denotes the sector of origin,  the second  the sector of destination. Upper case
letters are reserved  for endogenous  variables,  unless  they have  a bar, in which  case they  are
exogenous  variables  or normalizing  constants.  Parameters  and policy  variables  are denoted
by Greek or lower  case latin letters. Variables  with a tilde over them represent  nominal
magnitudes.  There are four sectors  indexed  over i or j: Agriculture,  Light  Manufacturing,
Heavy  Manufacturing,  and Services  (A, H, L, and S respectively).
We use CES and CET functions  to describe  substitution  possibilities  in trade. To
save  on notation,  note that CES  and CET  functions  can  be written  symmetrically,  using  the
same share parameter a  and exponent p: X =  CES(F 1,  F2; a, p, A) where the CES
substitution  elasticity  a and CET transformation  elasticity  n are given by a  =  1/(1 -p);
-C <p  <  + 1  in the CES case and n  =  l/(p  - 1); 1 <  p <  +co  in the CET case.  In both
cases,  the function  is written:
X  - A  [at Ff  + (1  - a)  F2' ]  'IP
Table  Al lists  the equations  describing  the model  underlying  the simulations  reported
in Section  Vl.  The model includes  the export  externality,  the import externality,  and an
assumption  of differential  factor productivities  for capital  and labor across  sectors. The
export externality  is the same as the one introduced  for the simple  model in Section  IV,
except  that it now applies  to exports  of light and heavy  manufacturing  (see equation  A8).
-32-The import  externality  (equation  A7) increases  aWegate effective  capital  and hence has
economywide  implications.  Finally,  the assumption  of differential  factor  productivity  across
sectors is reflected  by fixed  distortion  parameters  in the first-order  conditions  for factor
demands  (see equations  A6 and A5).
Since  there is only  one consumer  who  maximizes  utility  given  by the equations  of the
ELES,  we have  chosen  as numeraire  the cost function  corresponding  to the ELES  so that,
given  our choice  of numeraire,  maximizing  supernumerary  expenditures  (see equation  Al)
is equivalent  to maximizing  utility. Also  note that exogenous  foreign  transfers,  B, expressed
in  foreign currency units, are  given to  the  representative  household and  that  the
government's  activity  is restricted  to collecting  and disbursing  tax revenues.
The values  for the externality  parameters  are discussed  in the main text. The factor
productivity  differentials,  or distortion  parameters,  are drawn from evidence  reported in
Chenery,  Robinson,  and Syrquin  (1986),  particularly  chapters  3, 5, and 8.  The assumed
values  for the base solution  are:
K  K  K A  - 0.84;  A2 - 1.44;  A3  -. 94;  4  0.80
L  LLL
l  -0.62;  A 2 - 1.25;  A3 -1.25;  A4 -1.24
The assumed  values  for sectoral  technology  and the structure  of the base solution
sectoral  outputs  are given  in Table A2,  and the social  accounting  matrix  (or SAM)  for the
base data is given in Table A3. The elasticities  for the CET, CES, and ELES functions
describing  export  supply,  import  demand,  and consumer  demand  are described  in Table 5
in the main text.
-33-In all experiments,  the following  assumptions  are made about factor  accumulation
and exogenous  technological  progress  in agriculture. The labor force is augmented  by
32 percent and the capital stock (net of depreciation)  by 79 percent.  These figures,
representative  of Korea  during  1975-85,  imply  annual  compound  growth  rates of 2.8  percent
and 6 percent respectively.  In agriculture,  exogenous  technological  progress  (on real value
added) of 79 percent is combined  with increasing  intermediate-input  requirements. The
input-output  coefficients  for intermediate  inputs  into agriculture  from the non-agricultural
sectors  are increased  by 40 percent. The elements  of column  I in Table  A2 become:  0.170,
0.100,  0.169,  and 0.125. In addition,  the entry from agriculture  to light manufacturing  is
doubled. As can be seen from the contribution  of the residual  to growth  in Table 5, this
combination  of technological  progress  and deepening  intermediate  input structure  yields  a
contribution  of the residual  to value-added  growth  in agriculture  of 4.3 percent.
-34-Table  Al: A Multisector  Model  with Trade Externalities
Welfare  Indicator
(Al)  w-  PQI  fr
Technologj
(A2)  xi - AX  Li  L(1-'1)
(A3)  V  - ai 
(A4)  - CES(D,,  M;  j,  ai, AQ,)
(A5)  Xi - CET(DL,  EL;  6j, n , A T)
Factor  Markets
(A6)  a  PNVX
. WK
LD  (1  i  -)  PNP,  -X
(A7!  L
Externalities
T.  ka 
ATk  e  ATk  L, H a]d  k
(A8)  Ek
ATk  - ATk  k e A, S or Ek  <  Ek
-35-BMH]  MH2MH
(A9)
B  -i  MH  < MH
Resource  Constraints  and Effective  Capital Stock
(A10)  E  -
(All)  K
(A12)  .Y'  - B  *K
Export Supply and Import Demand
Di  - 1  P
(A13)  i  PD  a
I  (l  - s6i) PEj
(A14  )Z)  *PD  1 °
M;  (1 - p)  .PM,J
Prices
(A15)  PQj  - (PM,  *  M 1 +  PD*  D,)/Q
(A16)  PN; - PX;  ajp  PQI
(A17)  PK - SPQI  *b
(A18)  PX; - (PE. *  E. + PDi *  Di) /A
(Al9)  PMi - PWM;  R  *(I  + tm;i)
(A20)  PEj - PWEi *R  *(I  + te,)
-36-Demand
(A21)  *  b 1 .S  P
(A2)  7i  - bi  -S/PK
(A23)  PQi *  q - PQ ' 1i + pi (? -- -' E  Q  yR*j)
jpj
Balance of Trade Constraint
(A24)  (PWM  MiP  -PW  E*) -B
Income  and Government  Revenue
(A25)  7-w  WL L  WKK+dr+,g*R
(A26)  - S  (tm  MM  *PWAfI  - te 1 Ei .PWE,)  PR
Market Equilibrium
(A27)  Q,  +Z,  + 
Numeraire
(A28)  P  - PKJO  f  (PQ/' 
-37-Tbe  Al  Input-Output  Coemdents  and  Factor Ratios
Input-Output  Coemcients  Ratior  Output:
Sector  Agpic  Ught mfg  Heny  mfg  Sevlkcs  K/XD  K/L  XD
Agticulture  0.170  0.111  0.060  0.048  1.44  1.61  224
Ught mfg  0.071  0.250  0.191  0.108  0.65  2.20  388
Heavy  mfg  0.121  0.180  0.239  0.05  0.76  4.21  188
Strvices  0.089  0.119  0.090  0.113  2.27  4.79  397
Table  A}  Social  Accounting  Matrix
Expenditures
Value  House-  Capital  Rest of
Receipts  Commodity  Act-ty  added  holds  account  world  Total
Commodity  597  509  120  1,226
Activity  1,064  133  1,197
Value  added  600  600
Households  600  600
Capital  account  120  120
Rest  of world  162  -29  133
Total  1,226  1,197  600  600  120  133
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